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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT K. BENCH, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant/ ] 
-vs- ] 
BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC., ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
' Case No. 860414 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues to be presented for review are whether the 
facts give rise to an accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff-
Appellant claims they do not, because there is no evidence of 
a consent or agreement by Plaintiff and that the circumstances 
from which the trial court found such accord and satisfaction 
cannot be construed to constitute such consent or agreement 
in view of the Utah cases that state emphatically that such 
determination must result from declarations of such a clear 
nature as to assure that the parties are aware of the extent 
and scope of such agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THF CASE 
Plaintiff brought an action to recover "uplifts" or 
compensation promised to him by his employer pursuant to a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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written contract. At the suggestion of Judge Conder, and 
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the deposition of 
Plaintiff-Appellant, which the Defendant had taken, was pub4 
lished, and the matter was argued to the court without further 
testimony. The trial court found there was an accoird and 
satisfaction because Plaintiff and Defendant had agreed that 
Plaintiff's contract could be completed in 18 months instead 
of the 24 months provided for and because of other factual 
circumstances. The trial court granted Defendant judgment of 
no cause of action, and Plaintiff appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TC ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
One of the facts Appellant is anxious to bring to this 
court's attention is that there are no facts developed by the 
testimony of witnesses in open court and tested by the fire of 
cross examination and by rebuttal testimony. There was a depo-
sition taken of Plaintiff-Appellant, and the pertinent documents 
were exhibits to that deposition. Defendant then made a motion 
for summary judgment that was scheduled for hearing shortly be-
fore the trial setting. At the time set for that hearing the 
deposition was published by agreement of both parties. The 
court (Judge Conder) then proposed that the matter be continued 
to the trial date and argued at length at that time and, further, 
that the parties stipulate that the matter could be considered 
on the deposition and the pleadings and memoranda contained in 
the file, so that it would be unnecessary for either party 
to bring witnesses on the trial date. Eoth parties agreed, 
and it was so ordered. * -
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While Appellant admits that he agreed to that proce-
dure, it is important to note that the agreement was proposed 
by the court under circumstances that made it difficult not 
to agree; that Plaintiff-Appellant was deprived thereby of 
the opportunity to present his witnesses, his story or his 
facts. (In deposition Plaintiff only answered Defendants 
counsel's questions; he did not present his own facts. 
Plaintiff's counsel, knowing that Plaintiff would be avail-
able at trial, had no incentive or reason for volunteering 
Plaintiff's story in deposition.) 
While Plaintiff-Appellant appears to be complaining, 
he agrees not only that he agreed to that procedure, but that 
it was reasonable and did not affect the outcome (the facts 
that Judge Conder relied on to reach his conclusion—that 
there was an accord and satisfaction would not have been 
changed by a formal trial.) The important point is the 
trial court was not advantaged by its observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses. The Supreme Court can read the 
pleadings, memoranda and deposition of Plaintiff-Appellant 
in the same way and to exactly the same advantage as the trial 
court could. 
To the extent possible, Plaintiff-Appellant wants to 
make this a one-point Brief, that point being that Judge Con-
der erred in finding an accord and satisfaction, because 
Plaintiff-Appellant never agreed to it. That was the sole 
basis of the trial court's decision. If that is in error, 
the judgment must be reversed. Accordingly, this recitation 
of facts will include only the facts bearing on the accord Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and satisfaction issue. 
There is a written contract. It is straightforward. 
It is entitled "Recital of International Employment Condi-
tions." It is Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff's deposition (R-194) 
It provides in addition to a basic wage or salary for what 
are entitled "uplifts." They are: 
1. Foreign Service Premium 7.5% of base salary 
2. Special Service Area 
Allowance 7.5% of base salary 
3. Hardship Premium 15 % of base salary 
4. Completion Allowance: 
After one year 17 % of base salary 
Subsequent years 25 % of base salary 
Thos "uplifts" were not paid as agreed. (Deposition 
£.194, page 56, line 21). Defendant Bechtel, by its repre-
sentatives, called a meeting of all affected employees in 
Jubail, Saudi Arabia at which it announced by an oral presen-
tation that the completion allowance would be reduced for the 
first year from 17 per cent to 8 per cent and for subsequent 
years from 25 per cent to 15 per cent; the Foreign Service 
Premium of 7.5 per cent would be eliminated, and the Special 
Service Area Allowance would be eliminated (Deposition R.194 
at page 49, beginning at line 18 to page 51, line 6). 
Plaintiff Bench objected at that time by asking the 
question, "What if I don't want to accept?" (Deposition R.194 
page 52, lines 6-15) Plaintiff was then advised to "Go talk 
to Ray Portlock," the project manager. As Plaintiff attempted 
to talk to Portlock, a new letter was distributed indicating 
there would be a new package of documents to sign outlining 
the new payment programs. Shortly thereafter a second general Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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meeting of affected employees was called by Ray Portlock at 
which it was announced that the new package of documents 
would not be sent out. At that meeting Plaintiff objected 
and asked "What would happen to those of us who didn't want 
to continue, but had not yet met our 18-month duration for 
the tax exemption?" to which Portlock responded "That option 
to leave would be open to all of those upon completion of 
their exemption." (General narrative is at Deposition R.194, 
pages 52 to 56. Specific question and answer of Portlock is 
at p. 56, lines 6-15). 
After Plaintiff had completed the 18 months required for 
his foreign service tax exemption, he wrote a letter to Port-
lock asking for confirmation of his options regarding early 
completion. (Deposition R.194, Exhibit 12) Thereafter Plain-
tiff's supervisor, a Max Nezam, relayed Portlock's response 
agreeing to Plaintiff's contract completion as long as it was 
after January 1, 1983 so that Defendant would have time to 
find another person to fill Plaintiff's position. (Deposi-
tion, R.194 at pages 66 and 67) Plaintiff then wrote a letter 
to Nezam confirming that conversation and requesting contract 
completion as of January 31, 1983. It was in that letter that 
he indicated "It has been a pleasure working with you in the 
audit group here at Jubail, and I would look forward to work-
ing with you in the future. I appreciate your help and con-
sideration in this matter." (Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 13) 
Plaintiff further testified in his deposition"that he 
discussed with Nezam his feeling that the Defendant Bechtel 
-5-
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could not legally cut wages specified in a contract; that 
Bechtel was taking advantage of its employees1 circumstances 
where they were serving in a foreign country so far from 
home and that while Plaintiff enjoyed serving with Nezam, 
Plaintiff's total reason for leaving was the decrease in 
pay. (Deposition R. 194 at page 101, line 10 to page 103, 
line 14. Also page 67, lines 10-14) 
As Plaintiff checked out from his employer, he received 
a document entitled "Handpays" which contains a statement "net 
final wages from job 11967/Jubail." Plaintiff signed that 
document on a line that says "Check and COSI card received by 
(signature Bench) ." (Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 15) 
Plaintiff also received and negotiated a final paycheck which 
included on a stub, which was intended to be torn off before 
the check was negotiated, the statement "In settlement cf net 
final wages from job 11967/Jubail." (Deposition R. 194, Ex-
hibit 18) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUM1NTS 
There is only one argument presented which is that the 
trial court erred when it found an accord and satisfaction 
absent any evidence of agreement or consent by Plaintiff; 
and especially absent any delcaration of such a clear nature 
as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of the extent and scope 
of such claimed accord as required by the Utah cases. 
Plaintiff also objected to certain of the Findings on 
the ground that they did not conform to the evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT—POINT I 
THERE COULD NOT BE AN ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF NEVER 
AGREED TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE 
UPLIFTS IN QUESTION. 
It is clear that Plaintiff left his employment 
with Defendant because of the attempted unilateral 
decrease in the "uplifts." Judge Conder's Memoran-
dum Decision recites Plaintiff's statement to his 
supervisor Nezam that his total reason for leaving 
was the decrease in pay. It is also clear that there 
was a dispute about whether Defendant could change the 
- 6 P J -
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contract unilaterally. Plaintiff testified that he ques-
tioned "whether his employer could legally cut wages spe-
cified in a contract" in that same conversation with Nezam. 
The court noted "that both sides concede there is a dispute" 
to which Defendant agreed. (R. 232 transcript, p. 37, line 
25 to p. 38, line 1) 
By the terms of the contract, Defendant could have ter-
minated its contract by giving one-month's written notice of 
assignment completion. (Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 4, item 
1) It did not do that. It could have obtained new mod-
ified employment contracts from its employees by mutual agree-
ment. It started to attempt that, but backed off when em-
ployees objected. Accordingly, the contract for the origin-
al uplifts was still in effect when Plaintiff left his em-
ployment unless it can be said that he agreed to the changed 
uplifts by accepting the reduced contract completion time 
(from 2 4 months to 18 months) or that he agreed to the changed 
uplifts by receipting for the "Handpays" document or by nego-
tiating his final check, or unless it can be said that he 
agreed to the changed uplifts by failing to object more stren-
uously or unless such agreement is indicated by his pleasant-
ries expressed to Nezam when he said in his letter that it v/as 
a pleasure working with Nezam and that his request to leave 
was not related to his job assignment. (Deposition P.. 194, 
Exhibit 13) 
This court has declared that accord and satisfaction is 
an affirmative defense and requires the party alleging it to 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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meet burden of proof as to every necessary element. Meg-
sick v. PHD Trucking Services, Inc., 615 P2d 1276 (1980) 
In that same case this court declared 
..that to effect an accord and satisfac-
tion, payment must result from declara-
tions of such a clear nature as to 
assure that the parties are aware of 
the extent and scope of such agreement. 
Plaintiff-Appellant urges that Defendant's agreement 
to reduce the contract completion time,provided Plaintiff 
would stay until Defendant could get his replacement was a 
reasonable thing for both parties to agree upon. It helped 
both of them. Defendant, having the burden of proof, has 
offered no evidence that that agreement was linked to Plain-
tiff's acceptance of the reduced uplifts. No such evidence 
is available. Certainly there is no declaration of such a 
clear nature as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of the 
extent and scope of the claimed agreement, as required by 
Messick. 
The receipt on the "Handpays" document was similarly 
just that: a receipt for a document. The negotiation of 
the final check did not require Plaintiff's acquiescence 
in the statement contained thereon as in the case of pro-
vision for endorsement that says something like "endorse-
ment or acceptance of this check constitutes payees agree-
ment that it is payment in full, etc." It is simply a 
statement of the maker of the check that it regards the check 
as a settlement of final net wages. That portion of the 
check was intended to be torn off before it was negotiated. 
Plaintiff knew that Defendant claimed the check was in set-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tiement of net final wages, but he was not asked to agree 
with that statement and did not agree with it. The Utah 
case of Hintze v Seaich, 20 Ut 2d 275, 437 P2d 202 (1968) 
is squarely in point. The court held in an almost exact-
ly similar situation that: 
/3*. . . Mr Williams cashed this check 
and denies that the cashing thereof 
constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 
We agree with him. In a Am.Jur.2d, 
Accord and Satisfaction § 15, it is 
said: 
The principle that an offer of 
payment of a lesser sum in discharge 
of a greater will result in a dis-
charge of the indebtedness only if 
the offer is made upon the condition 
that the creditor accept the offered 
sum in full satisfaction of the in-
debtedness, finds frequent applica-
tion in the case of checks and other 
remittances. The mere fact that 
the creditor receives a check or 
other remittance from his debtor 
for less than the amount which the 
creditor claims, with knowledge 
that the debtor claims to be indebted 
to him only in the amount paid, does 
not result in an accord and satis-
faction; the debtor must also in-
dicate that payment is offered upon 
satisfaction or not at all, or the 
circumstances must be such as to 
clearly indicate to the creditor that 
it was sent with that intention. 
Consequently, where a check is 
tendered, even though it accompan-
ies an account, if there is no ex-
T pression of the condition that it 
must be accepted in full payment, the 
r acceptance of the check does not con-
stitute an accord and satisfaction, 
as no agreement to that effect can 
be implied from the transaction. 
So too, the mere payment by a debtor 
of an amount denominated "a balance" 
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upon an account rendered and 
its retention by the creditor 
does not constitute an accord 
and satisfaction. 
There is another point: Plaintiff had no dispute with 
Defendant about his wages; it was his "uplifts" (Defendant's 
term per the contract) that Plaintiff disputed. Again, see 
the Messick case cited above which says: 
3. Accord and Satisfaction 
Since voucher which was attached 
1
 " to check and which stated"This is the 
balance of your account in full" 
did not state that the check was to 
be returned if it was not so accepted, 
it was clear that there was no meeting 
of minds that acceptance of the 
check by former salesman was to be 
in complete settlement of dispute 
with former employer as to commissions 
owed, and accordingly, former sales-
man's cashing of the check did not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction. 
and the Hintze case to the same effect. 
Judge Conder seemed to be concerned about Plaintiff's 
failure to object more strenuously and at every opportunity 
and about the pleasantries contained in Plaintiff's letter to 
Nezam. While unexpressed, it seems to be a concern that 
Plaintiff lulled Defendant to sleep; took advantage of Defen-
dant's offer to reduce the completion allowance period; and 
than brought suit after Plaintiff was safely returned to his 
home in Utah. A couple of observations: First, the offer 
to reduce the completion allowance period was offered to all 
of Defendant's employees. When Plaintiff attempted to con-
firm it, it was specifically conditioned on Plaintiff's stay-
ing until Defendant could get a replacement. So it was mu-
-10-
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tually advantageous. The amount paid was based on 18 months 
pay and not 24 months pay, so it was anticipated compensa-
tion and not extra compensation. That was only fair and,net 
generous,in view of the fact that it was Defendant's attempt 
to unilaterally modify the written contract that caused 
Plaintiff's early departure. Defendant would have been re-
quired to "complete" Plaintiff's contract, had it given the 
required one-month's notice of termination thereof, as re-
quired by the very first numbered paragraph of the contract. 
That completion would have included payment of Plaintiff's 
expenses to return home and other like expense. It is not 
as though Defendant had a right to strand Plaintiff in Arabia 
if he did not concur in Defendant's attempted unilateral 
change of the contract. More importantly/ Defendant was the 
author of the contract and provided for the means of termin-
ating it. In truth, the contract and the uplifts continued 
until Plaintiff left Arabia. The suggestion that little 
Plaintiff took advantage cf big Defendant by allowing that 
contract to continue without reminding Defendant that it 
was so continuing because it had not been terminated in 
accordance with its terms, is incongruous and reaches toward 
ludicrous. 
Defendant's announced intention to require all em-
ployees to sign substitute agreements and its later with-
drawal and retreat from that position indicates that it was 
Defendant and not Plaintiff that was trying to seduce the 
other with silence. (Most of Defendant's employees merely 
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accepted Defendant's unilateral change without complaint 
without realizing that it was contrary to the terms of their 
contract which continued until modified.) 
Lastly, Plaintiff's attempt to be pleasant by telling 
Nezam that it had been a pleasure working with him was only 
an effort to conduct himself as a gentleman. Plaintiff 
wanted to tell Max Nezam that it was not because of him that 
Plaintiff elected to leave and to reinforce the point that 
it was the instant dispute that caused the split and not any-
thing else. There was never a question but that Plaintiff 
disputed Defendant's attempted unilateral modification of 
the contract. It was not necessary for him to repeatedly 
reaffirm it by reminding Defendant that he could or that he 
intended to bring suit to resolve that dispute. 
Plaintiff claims that the basis of Judge Conder's 
error is an assumption by the Judge that an accord and sat-
isfaction can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and 
especially that it can be inferred from silence. This Court 
has taken great pains to announce that there is no such thing 
as an accidental or unintended accord and satisfaction. By 
Plaintiff's count, six of the last ten accord and satisfac-
tion cases over the past 20 years have taken pains to des-
cribe that basic principle in fresh terms. I have already 
discussed the Messick and Hintze cases. The other 4 cases 
and their approach to the point are as follows: 
A
* Sugarhouse Finance Co v. Anderson 610 P2d 13 69 
(1980) wherein the court recited as an essen-
tial to its validity : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(3) . . an asset or meeting of the 
minds of the parties. 
B. In Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P2d 
1383 (1977) the Court held: 
[3] An accord and satisfaction is a method 
of discharging a contract, or settling a 
claim arising from a contract, by substi-
tuting for such contract of claim an agree-
ment for the satisfaction thereof, and the 
execution of the substituted agreement. 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction 
there must be an offer in full satisfac-
tion of the obligation, accompanied by 
such acts and declarations as amount to 
a condition that if it is accepted, it 
is to be in full satisfaction, and the 
condition must be such that the party 
to whom the offer is made is bound to 
understand that if he accepts it, he 
does so subject to the conditions imposed, 
. The accord is the agreement and 
the satisfaction is the execution or 
performance of such agreement. . . . 
[A] This new, substitute agreement must 
be founded upon a legal consideration and 
must be consummated, by the assent or 
meeting of the minds of the parties, to 
the agreement. 
C. In Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 
535 P2d 1228, the Court held: 
[4,5] . . . The authorities dealing with this 
problem, including those cited and relied 
upon by the defendant, uniformly affirm 
that it must clearly appear that the 
parties so understood and entered into 
a new and substitute contract. To state 
the matter in traditional contract 
language: that there was a definite 
meeting of the minds on such an agreement. 
D. In Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Ut 
2d 186, 417 P2d 761 (1966) the Court observed that taking a 
check that bore the statement "Payment in full of the account 
below. Endorsement of check by payee is sufficient receipt." 
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did not constitute an accord and satisfaction where there was 
known to be a dispute. The Court said "The dispute negates 
any accord." 
Of those 6 cases, 3 reversed the decision of the trial 
court, and 3 affirmed. Three were also "Master and Servant" 
cases/ and 3 were not. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of Plaintiff's 
consent to the reduced "upliftsf" let alone informed consent 
or consent evidenced by declarations of such a clear nature 
as to indicate that Plaintiff was aware of an intended accord 
and satisfaction. What really happened is that Defendant 
attempted to bully through an unilateral change. The claimed 
accord and satisfaction is an afterthought. 
ARGUMENT—POINT II 
SOME OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW ARE ERRONEOUS 
While Plaintiff believes the accord and satisfaction 
argument above is pivotal and the basis of this appeal, Plain-
tiff feels compelled to complain about the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as a matter of housekeeping. The Find-
ings were signed by Judge Conder on June 26, 1986. Judge Con-
der retired as of the end of June, 19 86. Plaintiff believes 
June 26th was his last day in his office except June 29th 
when he came to participate in a farewell party. Because of 
those time constraints, it was impossible to obtain a hearing 
on the Findings and Judge Conder signed the Findings as pro-
posed by Defendant, without change. 
Plaintiff complains about Finding of Fact, number 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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wherein it said, "Plaintiff accepted the new package of 
benefits" because it infers a voluntary acceptance. There 
is nothing in the record that supports a claim that Plain-
tiff voluntarily accepted the new package of benefits. 
Plaintiff further complains of that portion of Finding 
number 9 that finds that Plaintiff "received the return to 
point of origin benefits. . . which under his original em-
ployment conditions he would have been entitled to only upon 
the completion of 24 months of employment," because it is in-
accurate. Plaintiff would have been entitled to "return to 
point of origin benefits if Defendant had terminated his con-
tract on one month's notice." In short, Plaintiff would have 
been entitled to those benefits if the contract was terminated 
or modified by Defendant without Plaintiff's consent for any 
reason. 
Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact number 11 because 
it says Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of his "net final wages 
from job" where in fact Plaintiff only acknowledged receipt of 
the handpays document that contained a statement about "net 
final wages." 
Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact number 13 because 
it infers that Plaintiff received the full relocation allow-
ance and other return to point of origin benefits that were by 
contrast payable only if he worked 2 4 months whereas he would 
have been entitled to those benefits if the contract was ter-
minated or modified by Defendant without Plaintiff's consent, 
for any reason. 
-15--
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Plaintiff objects to Conclusion of Law number three, 
because it is superfluous. The truth is Judge Conderfs 
Memorandum Decision is an accurate and probably a complete 
record of what he decided. It appears to Plaintiff that 
Judge Conder decided that there was an accord and satis-
faction and that that resolved the matter. It would have 
if the accord and satisfaction was not disputed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant had the burden of proving an accord and satis-
faction. It did not prove,either directly or by reasonable 
inference, an agreement by Plaintiff to the modified uplifts. 
Certainly it did not prove declarations of Plaintiff of such 
a clear nature as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of an 
agreement to the modified uplifts. 
The agreement provides for the uplifts in question. It 
has never been modified either by agreement of the parties 
or pursuant to its own terms. Accordingly, the uplifts in 
question are still owing by Defendant to Plaintiff. 
Judge Conderfs decision that there was an accord and 
satisfaction should be reversed. The matter should then 
be referred to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A^~&c $ 'rf-<~.u.~. 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Served four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief upon 
hd hci - u-e /1 ve Hit* 1/ 
Defendant-Respondent by mailing same to its attorney, 
James L. Warlaumont, CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON, 200 
American Savings Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 this rffc day of October, 1986. 
•^^.JUL C" ^  U^C~-
-u— 
'GERALD E. NIFLSON 
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(3) Order and Judgment 
(4) Notice of Appeal 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT R. BENCH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. : 
CIVIL NO. C 83-4178 
BECHTEL PETROLEUM, INC., : 
a Nevada Corporation, 
Defendant. 
At the trial of this case the parties proffered their 
evidence and argued the issues. Plaintiff claims that he has 
additional monies due him under an employment contract with the 
defendant. Essentially he claims that the contract provides for 
••uplifts on base compensation" for foreign service premium of 
7.5% of base salary and special area allowance of 7.5% of base 
salary. Completion incentive as a percent of base salary 
depending upon the time spent was adjusted but the pliantiff 
makes no claim for this . (TR 104) Other "uplifts11 were also 
provided but the plaintiff stipulated that he did not assert any 
claim except for those above. 
After plaintiff was in Saudi Arabia for about seven months 
the defendant advised the plaintiff that some of the "uplifts" 
were being adjusted in percent and some eliminated. Plaintiff 
voiced concern about the change but took no affirmative action 
(TR 101). Plaintiff testified: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Vi 
BENCH V. BECHTEL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Q: Do you believe that you communicated to anybody in 
Bechtel Corporation your dissatisfaction with that change and the 
fact that that was the reason for your leaving, and if so, in 
what way? 
A: Yes. I had a very candid discussion with my supervisor, 
Mr. Maz Nezam. As I set forth in my letter, I had no objections. 
I enjoyed the service with him. But I had discussed that my 
total reason for leaving was the decrease in pay. (TR 103) 
Approximately eleven months later the plaintiff terminated 
his services and returned to the USA. Prior to his departure 
from Saudi Arabia the plaintiff reviewed the final figures and 
acknowledged receipt of his "net final wages from job..." and 
cashed the check for the sum specified. 
In the "package11 of changes was a change in the "completion 
incentive" which allowed the plaintiff to take "contract complete" 
prior to the 24 month date. Plaintiff accepted this by a letter 
dated November 10, 1982, in which he made no objections to any 
changes or reductions in pay and stated: 
"It has been a pleasure working with you in 
the Audit Group here at Jubail and I would look 
forward to working with you in the future. 
I appreciate your help and consideration in 
this matter." 
This court finds that there has been an accord and satis-
faction. 
Judgment granted to the defendant, No Cause of Action. 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BENCH V. BECHTEL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant to prepare Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and 
submit same to plaintiff's attorney for approval as to form. 
Dated this 1 day of June, 1986. 
? / 
-r ._<* 
DEAN E. CONDER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies mailed to each counsel. 
» 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
« • • • ' • 
I . • ; * ." 
' » . '. 
Steven E. Clyde (0686) 
James L. Warlaumont (3386) 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ROBERT K. BENCH, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
VS. s 
BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC. , : 
Defendant. * Civil No. C-83-4178 
TRIAL OF this action came on regularly before the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, sitting without a jury, on May 
27, 1986, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
his counsel, Gerald Nielsen; Defendant was represented by its 
counsel, Steven E. Clyde and James L. Warlaumont. The parties 
agreed that the existing record before the Court, including the 
affidavit of Patrick Morgan and the Deposition of Robert K. 
Bench, would be proffered as the entire evidence and both parties 
then proceeded with closing argument on all issues joined by 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant's Answer and Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
\w*V 
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The Court, having considered the pleadings, the parties1 
stipulations and the evidence, and now being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1* Plaintiff Robert K. Bench is a Utah resident. 
2. Bechtel Civil and Minerals is a Nevada Corporation that 
does business in Utah and elsewhere. 
3. On or about March 30, 1981, Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into an employment relationship. The employment 
conditions at that time, including Plaintiff's compensation 
package, were set out in a Recital of International Employment 
j; Conditions, a Tax Letter and Employment Conditions — Jubail. 
4. Plaintiff worked as an employee of Defendant from May 1, 
1981 until January 31, 1983. 
5. The compensation package originally provided for certain 
uplifts on a base salary, including a foreign service premium of 
7.5% of base salary, a special area allowance of 7.5% base 
salary, a hardship premium and a "completion-1 incentive paid 
annually based on a percentage of base salary paid that year. 
The compensation policy also provided that Plaintiff would be 
eligible to receive certain benefits after twenty-four months of 
employment and on an annual, basis thereafter, including the 
incentive uplift for the second year of employment, accrued 
vacation, return transportation to the United States, shipment of 
household effects and allowances for relocation. 
i 
DC ft PRATT I. 
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6. In August, 1981, after Plaintiff began to work for 
Defendant, the United States Congress enacted the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) (H.R. 424, 97th Congress; Public Law 
97-34) that took effect on January 1, 1982 and altered the tax 
structure upon which the compensation package was based. 
7. Defendant revised its compensation policy in light of 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act and adjusted some uplifts and 
eliminated others. The package of changes also included a change 
in the completion incentive which allowed Plaintiff to terminate 
and receive return to point of origin benefits, including a pro 
rata completion incentive, prior to completion of twenty-four 
months of employment. 
8. Defendant informed Plaintiff of the proposed adjustments 
and eliminations prior to January 1, 1982. Although Plaintiff 
expressed concern about the adjustments and changes at that time, 
he took no affirmative action to collect the monies he now claims 
were not paid as a result of the adjustments and changes. At no 
time during his employment between May 1, 1981 until January 31, 
1983, did Plaintiff make a written or oral demand for the monies. 
9. On or about November 10, 1982, after eighteen months of 
employment, Plaintiff accepted the new package of benefits and 
terminated his employment as a result of the adjustments and 
received the return to point of origin benefits, including a pro 
rata completion incentive payment, which under his original 
employment conditions he would have been entitled to only upon 
the completion of twenty-four months of employment. 
* 
<^A 
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10. In accepting the package of changes by a letter, dated 
November 10, 1982, Plaintiff made no objection to any changes or 
reductions in his pay and stated: 
It has been a pleasure working with you in the Audit 
Group here at Jubail and I would look forward to 
jj working with you in the future. I appreciate your help 
;| and consideration in this matter. 
11. Dpon Plaintiff's termination he acknowledged receipt of 
!; his "net final wages from job" on a payroll sheet that expressly 
• declares that Plaintiff's final check, which included the 
I  
, adjusted compensation, was to be drawn to the order of Plaintiff 
• i 
;: "in settlement of net final wages". 
jj 12. The final check that Defendant drew expressly stated 
j; that it was "in settlement of net final wages" for the sum 
j; specified and Plaintiff negotiated the check* 
ii 
I 
ji 13* In accordance with the changed compensation package, the 
t\ 
I final check included and Plaintiff received the pro rata 
completion incentive, the full relocation allowance, and other 
I; return to point of origin benefits even though Plaintiff had not 
i worked twenty-four months. 
!] 
j' Prom the foregoing findings of fact the Court makes and 
enters its 
j; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff and Defendant Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Inc. 
ft PRATT 
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2. Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Inc., is not liable to 
Plaintiff for any amounts claimed due because the acceptance 
without reservation of the offer and the negotiation of the final 
payment of completion benefits before twenty-four months of 
employment constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 
3. Based upon the foregoing, the Court does not need to 
decide Defendant's claim that Plaintiff is barred from pursuing 
this action because he was an employee at will. 
4. Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Inc., is awarded its costs 
in an amount to be taxed by the Cleric. 
DATED this 2-4 day of June, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXO^i^T-EV 1 
CLE3X 
%lOSdLOds^ DeaVEVConder CtaputyCi** M * W M U C i Sffl 
.sir: District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to 
be hand delivered on this Z 7 ~ day of June, 1986, to: 
Gerald E. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3737 Honeycut Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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•« •.^,--v. 
Steven E. Clyde (0686) 
James L. Warlaumont (3386) 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ b Qoft uo.QQq 
ROBERT K. BENCH, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs. i 
BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC., : 
Defendant. : Civil No. C-83-4178 
TRIAL OP this action came on regularly before the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, on May 27, 1986, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. sitting without a jury. Plaintiff was represented by 
his counsel, Gerald Nielsen; Defendant was represented by its 
counsel, Steven E. Clyde and James L. Warlaumont. Thereupon, the 
Court directed that this matter proceed on the issues joined by 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Defendant's Answer. The Court 
noted that Plaintiff and Defendant had appeared on May 6, 1986, 
at the hour of 8:00 a.m. for Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and further noted that the parties agreed at that time 
to rely on the evidence in the record, including affidavits and 
Plaintiff's Deposition, as the evidence for trial. Plaintiff and 
FILED IN C L E R ^ u r r ^ 
Salt Lake County Utah 
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Defendant then proffered that evidence and argued the case. The 
Court, having considered the pleadings, the parties' stipulations 
and the evidence, and having heretofore entered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 58(A)(b), U.R.C.P., 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Bechtel Civil and Minerals is hereby given and 
granted judgment on the merits against Plaintiff Robert K. Bench, 
no cause of action on his amended complaint. 
2. Defendant Bechtel Civil and Minerals is awarded its 
costs of court against Plaintiff. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 3-7 day of June, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXOWJ*,ND>#Y y\ ^_^^ /_ .^^^Li-^ 
DeanE7. Cdnder 
frputya«**""" Dis tr ic t Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT to be hand delivered to: 
Gerald E. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3737 Honeycut Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
on this 3 3 ^ day of June, 1986. 
A~*> 2LM.M 
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V 
Gerald E. Nielson (2412) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3737 Hbneycut Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
fitf.DiilClEPft'SdFihCt 
. - . . c - "MMt* MrAt= 
JUL 22 2 na PMf8H 
W THE THIED DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR S & T LAKE C 
! > • • • • 
STATE OF UTAH 
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DEPUTY oVEmr 
ROBERT K. BENCH, 
Plaintiff and appellant 
vs. 
BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC., 
Defendant.and respondent 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C-83-4178 
Robert K. Bench Plaintiff and appellant, herein, appeals from the order 
and judgment of District Court Judge Dean C. Condor dated June 27, 1986, 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated this 22nd day of July 1986. 
tW^JL 
'Gerald E. Nielson 
Attorney for appellant 
Served a copy of the foregoing notice of appeal upon defendant respondent 
by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attorney James L. Wkrlaumont this 
22nd day of July 1986. 
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